Banks and Brokers and Bricks and Clicks: An Evaluation of FINRA\u27s Proposal to Modify the  Bank Broker-Dealer Rule by Gross, Jill I.
Pace University 
DigitalCommons@Pace 
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
2010 
Banks and Brokers and Bricks and Clicks: An Evaluation of 
FINRA's Proposal to Modify the "Bank Broker-Dealer Rule" 
Jill I. Gross 
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jill I. Gross & Edward Pekarek, Banks and Brokers and Bricks and Clicks: An Evaluation of FINRA's 
Proposal to Modify the "Bank Broker-Dealer Rule", 73 Alb. L. Rev. 465 (2010), 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/741/. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
BANKS AND BROKERS AND BRICKS AND CLICKS: AN
EVALUATION OF FINRA'S PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE "BANK
BROKER-DEALER RULE"
Jill I. Gross*
Edward Pekarek**
I. INTRODUCTION
Paula P., a risk-averse individual with no investment experience
and no significant assets,1 walks into her local bank branch
recently, intending to renew her one year Certificate of Deposit
("CD") and seeking interest on her $20,000 in savings accumulated
over a lifetime of modest employment. Pat, the bank teller,
recommends that she talk to Joe D. who works in the office and who
may be able to help her obtain a higher rate of return on her money.
Paula agrees, and Joe takes her over to his cubicle, eagerly
explaining that he has "something better" for her than the CD she
sought to renew. Paula, pleased to learn she could earn a higher
interest rate on her savings, agrees to work with Joe. After signing
a few papers that Joe says are merely "red tape," they complete the
transaction, and Paula leaves the bank a satisfied customer. Paula
does not realize, however, that she just purchased shares of a
speculative "junk bond" mutual fund-an investment product
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School, and Director, Pace Investor Rights Clinic ("PIRC").
This article is based, in part, on a Comment Letter the authors filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") in response to the proposed rule change of the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") to adopt FINRA Conduct Rule 3160 in its
Consolidated Rulebook. See SEC Comment Letter from Jill I. Gross & Edward Pekarek,
Director and Clinical Law Fellow, Pace Law School Investor Rights Clinic, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2009-047/finra2009047-4.pdf.
** Clinical Law Fellow, PIRC, Pace Law School.
While Paula is a fictional character, her story is based on a typical fact pattern that the
authors have heard repeatedly from clients of PIRC. Opened in 1997, PIRC is the nation's
first law school clinic in which Juris Doctor students, for academic credit and under close
faculty supervision, provide pro bono representation to individual investors of modest means
in arbitrable securities disputes against broker-dealers and their associated persons. See
Barbara Black, Establishing A Securities Arbitration Clinic: The Experience at Pace, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 35 (2000).
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wholly different in risk than a CD.
This is the story of countless unsuspecting and unsophisticated
banking customers who enter the seemingly "safe and sound"
confines of their trusted financial institution 2 seeking low-risk,
insured, depository savings products, but are lured into purchasing
volatile, uninsured non-depository investment products they often
do not understand, only to later suffer substantial losses and learn
that FDIC (or FSLIC) insurance is unavailable to make them
whole. 3 Customers like Paula have been victimized by a regulatory
scheme that permits broker-dealers to operate on the premises of
financial institutions without fully disclosing to customers the
fundamental differences between a depository institution and a
broker-dealer and the products and services each respectively
markets. 4 Financial regulators repeatedly have failed to proscribe
this manipulative behavior, to the detriment of countless retail
investors.
This article evaluates the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority's ("FINRA") 5 proposal to adopt a modified version of
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Rule 2350,
known as the "bank broker-dealer rule,"6 which, if approved by the
2 Of course, the hallmark of the depository financial institution is "the presence of full
faith and credit [of the United States] behind deposit insurance," unlike the uninsured non-
deposit Wall Street products often pushed by affiliated brokers. CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (2d ed. 2006).
3 See, e.g., SEC Comment Letter from Richard E. Horn, Vice President, BankBoston
Investor Servs., Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (June 6,
1997) (citing Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mutual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics, Investor
Knowledge, and Sources of Information 10-11, 15-16 (June 24, 1996) (unpublished working
paper, on file with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), available at
http://comptrollerofthecurrency.gov/ftp/workpaper/wp97-13.pdf), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71097/horn1.txt; see also Frederick T. Furlong & Simon H.
Kwan, SAFE & SOUND BANKING, 20 YEARS LATER: WHAT WAS PROPOSED AND WHAT HAS BEEN
ADOPTED (Aug. 17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco), available at http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0608/kwan-furlong.p
(if.
" A financial institution must determine if undertaking various securities activities may
cause it to meet the definition of "broker" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(4) (2006), or whether it falls within one of the exceptions from the broker-dealer
definition offered by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, §§ 201-202, 113 Stat. 1338, 1385-91 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). If it does not fit within an exception, the securities activity is typically
"pushed-out" to a broker-dealer that is a FINRA member and registered with the SEC.
5 FINRA was created in 2007 following the consolidation of the NASD with the
enforcement, member regulation and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). See FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
6 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 3160 (Networking
Arrangements Between Members and Financial Institutions) in the Consolidated FINRA
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Banks and Brokers and Bricks and Clicks
SEC, would be designated as FINRA Rule 3160 within FINRA's
Consolidated Rulebook ("proposed rule change").7 The proposed
rule change ostensibly seeks to prevent FINRA member firms that
offer broker-dealer products and services through contractual
"networking arrangements" with financial institutions-both on
and off the premises of those institutions-from undertaking certain
business practices that might tend to confuse or harm customers of
financial institutions.8 The proposed rule change also aims to
prevent customer confusion by, inter alia, ensuring that certain
disclosures are made to customers so they can understand and
appreciate the distinction(s) between the products and services sold
by a financial institution and those sold by its broker-dealer
affiliate. 9
As discussed in this article, the proposed rule change protects
bank customers who may be solicited for the purchase of investment
products and services, but only to a limited extent. It does not
rectify sales practices of broker-dealers-affiliated with financial
institutions-which tend to confuse, and even mislead, financially
unsophisticated investors of modest means who can least afford to
be exposed to excessive risk. Additionally, the proposed rule change
adds no meaningful surveillance, inspection, enforcement, or
punitive mechanisms to prevent and/or redress insidious practices
that are akin to "bait and switch" tactics and are particularly
effective against financially unsophisticated investors. In fact, the
proposed rule change even rolls back some key regulatory
provisions, an especially unsettling retreat when one considers the
lack of oversight during the recent market malaise and the
contribution that such abridgement may have made to the present
economic contraction as a reverse "wealth effect" impinges upon
consumer behavior. In short, as demonstrated below, the proposed
rule change is inadequate to sufficiently protect investors and
promote genuine market integrity.
II. THE HISTORY OF REGULATING NETWORKING ARRANGEMENTS
Prior to implementation of the "bank broker-dealer rule," the SEC
governed networking arrangements between financial institutions
and broker-dealers through the issuance of interpretive "no-action"
Rulebook, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,774, 41,774-75 (Aug. 18, 2009).
7 Id.
s Id. at 41,775.
9 Id.
20101
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letters. 10 On November 24, 1993, SEC staff issued what became
known as the "Chubb Letter," which detailed SEC policy relating to
certain broker-dealer operational activities that occurred on the
premises of financial institutions. 1 After the release of the Chubb
Letter, the four main federal bank regulators issued an
"Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment
Products" ("Interagency Statement") on February 15, 1994.12 The
Interagency Statement adopted many of the Chubb Letter
provisions and directed banks and savings institutions to adhere to
those principles when either: (1) effecting direct sales of securities
to customers; or (2) overseeing NASD members in connection with
the purchase or sales of securities on their premises. 13
In 1995, NASD proposed new Conduct Rule 2350 ("Broker-Dealer
Conduct on the Premises of Financial Institutions"), based largely
on the Chubb Letter and the Interagency Statement, in order to
establish uniform and consistent standards to govern "the activities
of NASD members that are conducting broker-dealer services on the
premises of a financial institution where retail deposits are
taken."14  Three years later, on November 4, 1997, the SEC
approved Rule 2350, also known as the "bank broker-dealer rule."15
10 See Chubb Securities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 565540 (Nov. 24, 1993)
[hereinafter Chubb No-Action Letter]. Networking arrangements typically fall into two main
categories: (1) referral arrangements; and (2) standard arrangements. OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK § 710.3 (2004), available at
http://files.ots.treas.gov/422201.pdf [hereinafter OTS HANDBOOK]. A referral arrangement is
a written agreement by which financial institution employees refer customers to an affiliated
broker-dealer, and the related sales activities of non-depository investment products and
services occur outside of the confines of the financial institution. Examples of permissible
referral activities include, "provid[ing] customers with the broker-dealer's promotional
materials, direct[ing] them to telephones for placing orders, or provid[ing] a toll free
telephone number." Id. Standard networking arrangements are generally used for on-site
sales of investment products and services, pursuant to a customer access agreement between
a financial institution and a registered broker-dealer that is typically situated within the
financial institution, and is often either: (i) an unaffiliated third-party; (ii) a service
corporation; or (iii) an affiliate. Id. § 710.3 to .4.
11 See Chubb No-Action Letter, supra note 10, at *1-'4.
12 Interagency Statement from Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, et al., to
American Bankers Association (Sept. 12, 1995), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/95-94.txt ("Joint Interpretations of the Interagency
Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products") [hereinafter Interagency
Statement].
13 Id. at 1.
14 94-94 NASD Requests Comment on Proposed Rule Governing Members Operating on
Bank Premises, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&element
_id=1439 (last visited Feb. 23 2010).
15 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment
No. 5 to Proposed Rule Change Governing Broker-Dealers Operating on the Premises of
HeinOnline -- 73 Alb. L. Rev. 468 2009-2010
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On November 12, 1999, through "the culmination of a $300
million lobbying effort by the banking and financial-services
industries,"16 Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLB"), repealing key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act of 193317
and eliminating the long-standing separation of insurance, banking,
and securities businesses.18 GLB did nothing to enhance investor
knowledge or awareness, yet it permitted-and even fostered-the
blending of seemingly secure depository savings institutions with
the high-flying speculative culture of investment banking. 19
Following the passage of GLB, unsophisticated depository
customers were exposed to a slew of new offerings from giant hybrid
financial services entities which, according to at least one observer,
"were given the right to merge into behemoths, but regulators
remained scattered and focused on a world that had ceased to
Financial Institutions, Release No. 34-39294, 65 SEC Docket 1779 (Nov. 4, 1997), available at
1997 WL 685310.
16 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009, at 48.
17 Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162-195 (1933) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
is See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 623 (1971) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a)
(2006), as the statutory authority for this division); see also Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1988); Effects of Consolidation on
the State of Competition in the Financial Services Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 20 (1998) (statement of Hon. John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/1787.pdf; Daniel Gross, Shattering Glass-Steagall:
Lehman's Failure Marks the End of an Era, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/159092.
19 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Columbia University Economics Professor and 2001 recipient of the
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, attributes the 2008 economic collapse largely to
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act:
The most important consequence of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect-it lay in
the way repeal changed an entire culture. Commercial banks are not supposed to be
high-risk ventures; they are supposed to manage other people's money very
conservatively. It is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the
tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have traditionally managed
rich people's money-people who can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns.
When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the
investment-bank culture came out on top. There was a demand for the kind of high
returns that could be obtained only through high leverage and big risk taking.
Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 48. But see Clyde Mitchell, Ten Years After Gramm-Leach-Bliley: A
Defense, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 2009, at 3 (quoting Lawrence H. White, How Did We Get into This
Financial Mess? 2 (Cato Inst. Briefing Papers No. 110, 2008), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubsIbpfbpllO.pdf.) According to Lawrence White, repeal of the key
provisions of Glass-Steagall
opened the door for financial firms to diversify: a holding company that owns a
commercial bank subsidiary may now also own insurance, mutual fund, and investment
bank subsidiaries. Far from contributing to the recent [economic] turmoil, the greater
freedom allowed by [GLB] has clearly been a blessing in containing it.
White, supra, at 2.
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exist."20  Just months before the recent economic decline
accelerated, John Reed, the "architect" of the merger of Travelers
(insurance), Citibank, N.A. (commercial banking), and Salomon
Smith Barney (securities brokerage and investment banking)-
which was then the world's largest financial services firm,
Citigroup-reflected on that transaction and admitted it was a
"mistake." 21
Years after GLB's passage, Congress promulgated the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, which, inter alia, required
the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board to adopt final rules
addressing the matter and to implement the exceptions to the
definition of "broker" under GLB section 201 to govern the joint
activity of banks and broker-dealers. 22 Commentators may differ
about the root causes of the 2008-09 market collapse and the "Great
Recession" that followed, but even some of the staunchest GLB
proponents point to insufficient regulatory oversight as one main
cause for recent market and economic turmoil.23
III. PROPOSED FINRA CONDUCT RULE 3160
The proposed rule change aims to harmonize FINRA rules 24 with
20 Chris Suellentrop, Sandy Weill: How Citigroup's CEO Rewrote the Rules so He Could
Live Richly, SLATE, Nov. 20, 2002, http://www.slate.com/id/2074372/.
21 Francesco Guerrera, Citi Merger Architect Calls Deal 'Mistake,' FIN. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/adb7e4a6-019d-lldd-a323000077bO7658.html; see generally,
Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia
National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 679-81 (2008).
22 See Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, 120 Stat.
1966 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-
09 (2006); SEC Regulation R, 17 C.F.R. §§ 247. 100 to .781 (2010).
23 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 10 ("[T]he [SEC] never really was given (or exercised)
sufficient regulatory authority over investment banks and their capital positions, which,
based upon their deterioration (Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley and Merrill) and failure
(Lehman Brothers), proved to be inadequate.").
24 The FINRA rulebook, presently known as the 'Transitional Rulebook," is comprised of:
(1) NASD Rules; and (2) the rules incorporated from the NYSE. FINRA, INFORMATION
NOTICE: RULEBOOK CONSOLIDATION PROCESS 2-3 (2008)
http://www.finra.orgweb/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p038121.pdf.
In connection with its ongoing process to consolidate the Rulebook, FINRA staff is reviewing
existing NASD and NYSE Rules for: (1) obsolescence; (2) differences between them; (3) ways
to synthesize them; and (4) rules that can be transferred into the Consolidated Rulebook
without substantive modification. Id.
[A]s the SEC approves new rules for inclusion in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook and
they become effective, FINRA members will become subject to those rules .... [he
Transitional Rulebook will be reduced by the elimination of those rules that address the
same subject matter of regulation. When the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook is
completed, the Transitional Rulebook will have been eliminated in its entirety.
Id.
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relevant provisions of GLB and Regulation R.25 The proposed rule
change calls for FINRA members to: (1) establish written
networking agreements with banks identifying responsibilities and
compensation; (2) segregate the retail deposit-taking area from all
securities activities occurring on bank premises; (3) permit some
inspection and examination access by the SEC and FINRA; (4)
require customer communications to "clearly" identify that all
brokerage services are provided by the broker-dealer, not by the
bank; (5) disclose that securities products offered are not insured
like savings products; and (6) make reasonable efforts while opening
an account to obtain a customer's written acknowledgement of the
receipt of the required disclosures. 26
While the proposed rule change contemplates broker-dealer
internet activities generally, adoption of the setting regulations of
the proposed rule change would address-by implication through
the FINRA by-laws--only "on premises" activities in the "retail
deposit-taking area."27  Unfortunately, this provision ignores the
fact that there are an ever-increasing number of bank deposits.
These include "substitute drafts," as defined and permitted by the
"Check 21 Act," and electronic payroll deposits, 28 both of which are
facilitated online, and which should logically result in expansion of
the covered "area" to include cyberspace-at least for the purposes
of appropriate setting regulation. 29 In our view, the proposed rule
25 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 3160 (Networking
Arrangements Between Members and Financial Institutions) in the Consolidated FINRA
Rulebook, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,774, 41,774-75 (Aug. 18, 2009); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09; SEC
Regulation R, 17 C.F.R. § 247.700 to .781; see also Definitions of Terms and Exemptions
Relating to the "Broker" Exceptions for Banks, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,514, 56,514 (Oct. 3, 2007)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 218, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 247); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n & Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Agencies Adopt Final Rules to Implement the Bank "Broker" Provisions of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressbcreg/20070924a.htm.
26 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 3160 (Networking
Arrangements Between Members and Financial Institutions) in the Consolidated FINRA
Rulebook, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,774, 41,774-75 (Aug. 18, 2009).
27 NASD RULE 2350(c)(1) (2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&element-id=3650.
28 See Check Clearing for the 21st Century (Check 21) Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-18 (2006).
2 Investors would benefit from the use of a broadly defined concept of the banking space,
much like a "facility" is defined with regard to the activities of an exchange. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(2) ('The term facility when used with respect to an
exchange includes its premises, tangible or intangible property whether on the premises or not,
any right to the use of such premises or property or any service thereof for the purpose of
effecting or reporting a transaction on an exchange (including, among other things, any
system of communication to or from the exchange, by ticker or otherwise, maintained by or
with the consent of the exchange), and any right of the exchange to the use of any property or
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change, in its present form, is a regulatory setback that
substantially undermines the maxims of market integrity and
investor protection, particularly in light of the increasing
information asymmetry that exists between broker-dealers and
their customers.
IV. INVESTMENT ILLITERACY AND CUSTOMER CONFUSION: THE NEED
FOR REGULATION
Over the past twelve years, individual investors have been
confused regarding the role of the financial institution-as defined
within the proposed rule change-with respect to the securities
activities of affiliated broker-dealers through network
arrangements. 30 Investment illiteracy research conducted by the
SEC in conjunction with the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency revealed pervasive customer confusion that extended
across financial product "distribution channels."3' For example,
more than one of every eight (13.3%) mutual fund investors who
participated in that study, and who invested through the so-called
"bank broker-dealer" distribution channel, incorrectly believed they
could not suffer a loss of principal in a bond fund investment;
around one of every five (20.1%) such investors inaccurately
concluded they could not lose principal in a money market fund; and
more than one-third (36.4%) of those surveyed had invested with
the misapprehension that money market funds are federally
insured.32 Another investment illiteracy study from the same era
made the startling determination that "fewer than one-fifth of all
individual investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or other securities)
could be considered to be 'financially literate."' 33 According to the
most recent FINRA Investor Education Foundation study, financial
service.") (emphasis added).
30 See OTS HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 710.3.
31 See Alexander et al., supra note 3, at i. The mutual fund shareholder study consisted of
a "nationwide telephone survey of 2,000 randomly selected mutual fund investors who
purchased shares using the services of six different intermediaries, referred to as distribution
channels-brokers, banks, mutual fund companies, insurance companies, employer-sponsored
pension plans, and 'other' (e.g., financial planners)." Id.
32 Id. at 22 n.3, 34 tbl.4.
33 Id. at 4 (citing Albert B. Crenshaw, Before Risking the Money, Invest in Financial
Literacy, WASH. POST, May 19, 1996, at H1, H4). The NASD subsequently defined "investor
literacy" in 2003 as being "the understanding ordinary investors have of market principles,
instruments, organizations and regulations." APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NASD
INVESTOR LITERACY RESEARCH (2003) [hereinafter NASD RESEARCH], available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groupsInvestors@inv/@protect/documents/Investors/POl1459.pdf.
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illiteracy is not limited to any one cohort of investors. Worse still,
this troubling trend has actually accelerated among young adults,
who are notably less financially literate than previous
generations. 34
NASD's 2003 study of "a wide range of investors across income,
gender, size of investment portfolio and types of investments"
produced similarly dismal findings of investment illiteracy, despite
the fact that almost seventy percent of responding investors
"described themselves as being 'somewhat knowledgeable' about
investing."35 For example, just slightly more than one-third (35%)
of the NASD study's respondents were able to "answer[ ] ... seven
out of the ten of NASD's Basic Market Knowledge questions
correctly."36  Meanwhile, almost two-thirds (62%) of surveyed
investors either did not know or erroneously believed that they were
insured against stock market losses, and one-fifth of all respondents
believed that such insurance was provided either by the SEC (16%)
or the NASD (4%).37
TD Ameritrade, a FINRA member, funded investment illiteracy
research in 2006 which revealed that more than half of all investors
surveyed incorrectly believed that a stockbroker owes a fiduciary
responsibility "to act in [a customer's] best interest in all aspects of
the financial relationship."38 A FINRA Investor Education
Foundation study from the same year measured the level of senior
investor illiteracy, and found that "55% of respondents lost money
on an investment." Of those who lost investment principal, almost
one in five "attribute[d] the loss to being misled or defrauded[,] and
78% of those misled or defrauded did not report it." 39  These
34 See FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION FOUNDATION, FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2009), available at http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundatio
n/documents/foundation/pl20536.pdf. Financial illiteracy has become so significant that the
U.S. Social Security Administration is providing millions in funding for a Financial Literacy
Center founded by the RAND Corp., Dartmouth College, and the Univ. of Pennsylvania's
Wharton Business School to develop educational materials and programs to improve the
presently dismal financial literacy of Americans of all ages. See Press Release, RAND, RAND
Launches New Financial Literacy Center with Dartmouth College and the Wharton School
(Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.rand.org/news/press/2O09/10/07/financialliteracy.html
. The U.S. Treasury and Education Departments recently announced an initiative to increase
the financial literacy of high school students. See David Lawder, Obama Administration
Aims for High School Financial Literacy, REUTERS, Dec. 15, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BE3GG20091215.
35 NASD RESEARCH, supra note 33, at 3-4.
3 Id. at 6.
37 Id. at 9.
38 See TD Ameritrade Institutional, Investor Perception Study,
http://www.tdainstitutional.com/pdflInvestorPerceptionStudy.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
39 NASD, SENIOR INVESTOR LITERACY AND FRAUD SUSCEPTIBILITY SURVEY EXECUTIVE
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troubling findings translate into approximately 10% of all senior
citizen investors being defrauded at some point-with the majority
of defrauded seniors not reporting the fraud.40 The study also
concluded that many "victims of fraud are relatively knowledgeable
and active investors."41
The SEC maintained in 2007 that the prevention of fraud
targeting senior investors was a top priority, but conceded that this
laudable goal has remained elusive, due in large part to
substantially insufficient regulatory oversight, including erosion at
the edges of the governing rules.42  A 2007 FINRA Investor
Education Foundation study determined, not surprisingly, that
"[p]ersonal relationships factor into senior investor decision
making."43 According to the Electronic Financial Services Council,
"[i]nvestors are most vulnerable to high pressure sales tactics when
they are interacting personally with a salesperson in whom they
have placed their trust and confidence." 44 Two of every five senior
investors who participated in the 2007 FINRA study "hired a broker
recommended by a friend, relative, co-worker or neighbor."45 Nearly
three of every five (58%) senior investors who were defrauded
previously entrusted their investing activity to a broker based on a
personal recommendation. 46
At least one observer recently concluded that the presence of "a
'truth bias' caus[es senior citizens] to believe what they're told by
someone who appears to be authoritative."47 When customers are
SUMMARY (2006), http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/sai/@sai/documents/sai-original
-content/p036699.pdf.
40 FINRA, Senior Investor Literacy and Fraud Susceptibility Survey Key Findings,
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/@inv/@smart/documents/investors/p03681O.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to the
Senior Investor Protection Symposium (May 18, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch05107cc.htm; see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
For Seniors, http://www.sec.gov/investor/seniors.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
43 FINRA, Senior Fraud Risk Survey
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/@inv/@smart/documents/investors/p036813.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010)
44 INTUIT INC. & ELEC. FIN. SERV. COUNCIL, PROMOTING EFFICIENT ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN PORTALS AND ONLINE BROKERS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/intuitefscpaper.pdf.
45 FINRA, Senior Fraud Risk Survey, supra note 43.
45 Id.
46 Id. Additional decision-making biases are examined in detail by at least one scholar
who has concluded that investor and consumer education programs are of questionable value.
See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 226 (2008).
47 See Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decision, and Investor Education, 7 ELDER L.J.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 3), available at
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told by a professional, surrounded by all the trappings of the bank
setting, that a product is "just like a CD, but even better," they
might be prone to accept the veracity of such puffery, due to the
phenomenon of "truth bias," particularly when the customer is a
financially unsophisticated senior citizen. 48 The studies cited above
demonstrate that the traditional financial institution setting has
the potential to create false impressions of safety and security for
customers who are ill-equipped to sense that they are being solicited
for their savings by professionals who typically enjoy an information
asymmetry and a position of trust.
V. VAGUE REGULATORY LANGUAGE AND SANCTIONS, LAx
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Bank customers commonly describe themselves as confused in
financial institution settings where there are no signs
distinguishing divisions within the bank, customer communications
are vague, disclosure is inadequate, and securities activities
transpire in close proximity to retail deposit-taking areas without
appropriate segregation. 49 Anecdotal evidence further suggests that
bank employees use customer account data in order to apply
relationship-based sales tactics when potentially investable funds
become available, such as on or near the maturity date of a
certificate of deposit. These customers likely do not know that the
bank employee who recommends an affiliated broker-dealer is
motivated by the compensation he or she receives for steering
customers toward non-depository products such as securities-
compensation which is limited only by bank-friendly Regulation R.5
0
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1291843.
48 Id. (manuscript at 3, 26).
49 We urge the SEC to altogether eliminate disclosure loopholes provided by the
Interagency Statement, a scheme crafted in response to banking industry lobbyist efforts,
which allow exempted non-disclosure in
[(i)] radio broadcasts of 30 seconds or less; [(ii)] electronic signs [which] may include
billboard-type signs that are electronic, time and temperature signs, and ticker tape
signs. Electronic signs would not include such media as television, on line services, or
ATM's; and [(iii)] signs, such as banners and posters, when used only as location
indicators.
Interagency Statement, supra note 12.
50 See 12 CFR § 218.701 (2009) (entitled "Exemption from the definition of broker for
certain institutional referrals'); 17 CFR § 247.701 (2009) (same). According to former SEC
Commissioner Laura S. Unger, "[t]he Commission [r]eceived [s]ubstantial [i]nput from the
[b]anking [clommunity and the Rules [rieflect [t]his [i]nput ... [and] [pirovide [filexibility to
[b]anks to [c]ompensate [elmployees." Pushing Back the Pushouts: The SEC's Broker Dealer
Rules: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 107th Cong. 63-65, 69-71 (2001)
(statement of Laura S. Unger, Former Acting Chairperson, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n),
20101
HeinOnline -- 73 Alb. L. Rev. 475 2009-2010
] s  ers    i s 475 
l   i l, r nded  l  i s    
ti , t t  i e , t  ,   
t    ept  ity  h ,    
non   l rly   r   
i lly isticated i r i . 8   t   
trate   itional ial it tion   
 l te  ions  ty  it  r 
t rs   i ped      i  t  
 i s  i als  i lly   r tion 
r   ti    
   I ,  
I  T 
 rs l   s    
i l it tion       
i   r ti ns 
   t ,   ties 
  t   ta ing s t 
i te ti .  t l ce  ts t 
 s  r t    
i - ased  ti s  tially le  
e         
t    rs     
e  s  te  l r  
  tion    
  t r    urities-
i   l   -friendly egulation R.50 
I _id=1291843. 
48 I . ( ri t  
49 e r e t e  t  lt t r li i t  i l re l l  i    
 t     , 
   
 ts ii  l t ic i  i   i l  
  ,  i ,  ti  t  
i    r 
   
 
    
0 i   r 
  rr ls'   
r   i  i  i l   
l  ] it    ] [ t .  ] l  
l   ] l ees." s ing ts:   
l : aring f   .  i ncial rvices, t  ongo - , -  ( ) 
 .   i  . ' , 
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That these and other misleading activities continue to take place,
despite the regime established by NASD Rule 2350, strongly
suggests that the current rule does not adequately prevent
unsophisticated investor confusion. At least one market observer
has acknowledged that "regulatory bodies have struggled with
implementation of the bank 'broker' provisions."51  Because it
appears designed to dilute the already inadequate status quo, the
SEC should not approve the proposed rule change.
Ambiguity within the proposed rule change, as it is currently
constructed, leaves ample room for sharp parsing and actually
invites misconduct. For example, the provision that intends to
adopt NASD Rule 2350(c)(4)(B) would require disclosures within all
of the member's "[ajdvertisements and sales literature that
announce the location of a financial institution."52 If, however, a
broker-dealer subsidiary employs an identical logo and a
confusingly similar trade name to that of the affiliated financial
institution, has that advertising content announced the name or
services of the financial institution within the meaning of the rule?53
The proposed rule change does not appear to prohibit such conduct.
The proposed rule change also substantially diminishes certain
compliance and disclosure mechanisms as compared to NASD Rule
2350. For example, by eliminating the requirement of NASD Rule
2350(c)(3)(B)-which compels broker-dealers to make objectively
reasonable efforts to obtain written customer acknowledgement of
the receipt of mandated disclosures-FINRA provides its members
far less incentive to ensure that associated persons are in fact
disclosing the required information. Instead, an associated person
can routinely state that he or she made the requisite disclosures
because the proposed rule would not affirmatively require an
investor acknowledgement to verify this contention. This aspect of
the proposed rule change, coupled with the absence of meaningful
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/08020ltslu.htm; see also Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
5' Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge, LLP, Implications of Regulation R on Bank
Distribution Channels Used for Insurance Sales,
http://www.eapdlaw.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?news=1125 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010)
(quoted material appears at n.3); see also The Hole on Brian Moynihan's Resume,
http://blogs.wsj.comldeals/2009/12/21/the-hole-on-brian-moynihans-resume/ (Dec. 21, 2009,
8:30 EST); Brian Moynihan: From Edwards & Angell to the Top of BofA,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/12/17lbrian-moynihan-from-edwards-angell-to-the-top-of-bofa/
(Dec. 17, 2009, 11:51 EST).
62 NASD RULE 2350(c)(4)(B) (2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&element-id=3650.
53 Id.
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record-keeping requirements, surveillance, and/or inspection
provisions regarding the efforts undertaken to obtain the customer
acknowledgement, is part of a pronounced retreat from the interests
of investor protection and market integrity.
Likewise, the proposed rule change dilutes the setting
requirements of the bank broker-dealer rule. Currently, NASD
Rule 2350(c)(1) unambiguously requires the setting of the financial
institution to be "clearly distinguished" from the broker-dealer. 54 In
contrast, subsection 3160(a)(1)(c) of the proposed rule change
requires a member firm to physically separate its broker-dealer
products and services from the "routine retail deposit-taking
activities of the financial institution," but only "to the extent
practicable." 55
This language is particularly problematic because it invites
subjective self-serving interpretation by the broker-dealer. The use
of substantially similar aesthetic elements (which are known as
"trade dress" and include identical interior d~cor, signage style,
logos, etc.) within retail bank branches that feature brokerage
products and services, as well as confusingly similar business
names and identical website addresses, can create the illusion in a
naive investor's mind-perhaps deliberately-that the broker and
the banker are actually one and the same.
Under the proposed regime, a broker-dealer could combine that
tactic with a dubious semantic determination that segregating the
banking area from the brokerage area is "impracticable," setting a
potential trap for the trusting customer. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that, even under the current regime, the physical
separation of space between some bank tellers and brokers is
negligible, and the interior banking areas either lack required
disclosure signage, are indistinguishable from each other, or both.
Rather than strengthening the setting requirements, the proposed
rule change weakens them without explanation.
Similarly, despite the fact that the radio industry changed its
54 NASD RULE 2350(c)(1) ("Wherever practical, the member's broker/dealer services shall
be conducted in a physical location distinct from the area in which the financial institution's
retail deposits are taken. In all situations, members shall identify the member's
broker/dealer services in a manner that is clearly distinguished from the financial
institution's retail deposit-taking activities. The member's name shall be clearly displayed in
the area in which the member conducts its broker/dealer services.").
55 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Adopt FINRA Rule 3160 (Networking
Arrangements Between Members and Financial Institutions) in the Consolidated FINRA
Rulebook, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,774, 41,774-75 (Aug. 18, 2009).
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pricing model five years ago56 to one where the "30-second
ad[vertisement became] the standard unit of measure for network
radio sales,"57 the relevant portion of the current rule, NASD Rule
2350(c)(4)(D), for some reason specifically excludes "radio
broadcasts of 30 seconds or less" from the disclosure requirements
of NASD Rule 2350(c)(4)(C). 58 The proposed rule change ignores
this important shift in broadcast media advertising and, despite its
claim "to give consideration to the rapidly evolving nature of the
securities business,"59 FINRA has continued to adhere to the 1995
Interagency Statement-an outdated proviso developed as the
internet entered its commercial infancy.60  The proposed rule
change will almost invariably increase confusion for customers of all
ages.
VI. FAILURE TO CLEARLY REGULATE INTERNET ACTIVITIES OF
BROKER-DEALERS
The proposed rule change fails to clearly regulate the confusingly
commingled internet presence of financial institutions and affiliated
broker-dealers, despite the fact that online banking now surpasses
visits to "brick and mortar" branches within key demographic
56 See Roy H. Williams, Radio Ads: How Long Should They Be? Everything You Need to
Consider When Choosing Between 15-, 30- and 60-Second Spots, ENTREPRENEUR, Sept. 13,
2004, http://www.entrepreneur.com/advertising/adcolumnistroyhwilliams/article72584.html.
Clear Channel Communications, one of the nation's largest radio station operators, forever
changed the radio industry pricing model in early 2005 to favor 30 second advertising spots.
"For the first time ever, 30- and 15-second ads will be priced worth the money. Up until now,
all radio ads were priced essentially the same, regardless of length, so everyone ran 60s ... 
Id.
57 Google Radio Misses Success by 30 Seconds, http://www.radiodirect.com/blogtp=173
(May 29, 2009, 10:03 EST).
58 Incidentally, "NASD Regulation staff has [also] extended this [non-disclosure] exception
to letterhead, envelopes, and business cards that do not reference investments or securities
products" directly, thereby relieving broker-dealer affiliates of the onerous burden of a nine-
word disclosure. See FINRA, Ask The Analyst: Advertising Regulation,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/viewall-display.html?rbid=1189&element I id=11590049
84 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). NASD Rule 2350 (c)(4)(C) calls for the following cautionary
language: "Not FDIC Insured, No Bank Guarantee, May Lose Value." NASD RULE
2350(c)(4)(C). It should be noted that FINRA's guidance was provided before the passage of
GLB.
59 FINRA, Information Notice: Rulebook Consolidation Process,
http:www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@regl@notice/documents/notices/p 17155.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
60 See Interagency Statement, supra note 12; see also Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet
Timeline 10, http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2010)
("1995 ... dial-up systems (CompuServe, America Online, Prodigy) begin to provide Internet
access.").
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groups.61 According to a 2007 FINRA study, "a majority of older
investors (55 and older) are interested in a variety of online
resources, [although] they are less interested than younger
investors.... [On the other hand, o]lder investors are more likely to
visit brokerage firm Web sites to research investment[s] than other
Web sites, such as Yahoo and Morningstar. 62
As mentioned above, younger Americans are more comfortable
with online and mobile banking technology, but they are also more
financially illiterate than any other cohort-two interrelated trends
which have serious implications given the lack of regulation of
securities activities on bank Web sites.63
Presently, domestic retail banking Web sites do not separate
information regarding banks and brokers, and these sites appear
not to be adequately inspected or prevented due to the lack of
appropriate surveillance, inspection, and enforcement mechanisms.
This contradicts federal regulatory guidance provided to the
banking industry which directs national banks to "make certain
that their disclosures on Internet banking channels, including Web
sites, remain synchronized with other delivery channels to ensure
61 More Consumers Prefer to Bank Online, Says American Bankers Assn.
http:/ Ilatimesblogs.latimes.com/money-co/2009/09/more-consumers-prefer-to-bankonline-
says-american-bankers-assn.html (Sept. 21, 2009, 13:26 PST) [hereinafter More Consumers
Prefer]. An August 2009 survey of 1,000 consumers conducted on behalf of the American
Bankers Association by market research firm Ipsos-Reid, revealed findings the bank lobbyist
called a "watershed change." Id. The study revealed that:
[Twenty-five percent] of all bank customers under age 55 now prefer the speed and
convenience of Internet banking to phone and mail options. For customers ages 18 to 34,
a whopping 38% preferred banking online. Among older customers, 26% still prefer
visiting their local branch. But just 21% of the overall group would rather bank at
physical locations, and only 17% prefer ATMs. Just 1%, mostly 18- to 34-year-olds, are
most likely to enjoy mobile banking on cellphones or personal digital assistants.
Id.
62 FINRA, INSIGHTS ON INVESTMENT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS COMPARING OLDER AND
YOUNGER INVESTORS (2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ investors/@inv/@smartjdocuments/investors/p036812.pdf.
63 See Check 21 Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (2006); Scanning Your Money to the Bank,
N.Y. Times Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/scanning-your-money-to-the-bankl
(Feb. 7, 2008, 17:29 EST) ("To use the service, consumers would sign onto their bank's Web
site, activate a piece of software, type in the amount, and then scan the front and back side of
each check they want to deposit. The bank has the option of immediately sending the check
image to be cleared or to have a human review it first.'); Wanna Deposit Checks from Home?,
MainStreet Blog, http://www.mainstreet.com/article/moneyinvesting/savings/remote-check-
deposit-slow-coming-consumers (July 13, 2009) ("Right now, the 150 largest banks offer this
service, which allows you to fax or email checks to your bank for deposit. Among those who
do are Key Bank [ ], Wells Fargo [ 1, Chase [ J, Citi [ ] and Bank of America [ ]. Many regional
banks provide remote deposit services as well. According to the Community Bankers of
America, 50% of banks offer remote deposit, and 70% plan to have it by next year.").
2010]
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the delivery of a consistent and accurate message to customers."64
A sampling of commercial banking Web sites reveals a pattern of
blending securities activities with traditional banking functions on
the same Web site, located at the same URL address, apparently
hosted on the same network server, and frequently used the same
widely-recognized bank logo(s), trade name(s), and trade dress.65
Often, the only "segregation" between bank and non-bank offerings
marketed online is an html-coded tab, button or hyperlink at or
near the top of a Web site. The Web site setup is designed to enable
customers to navigate information regarding checking and savings
accounts, credit cards, mortgages, home equity lines of credit
("HELOCs"), and student loans, along with a host of brokerage
activities involving non-depository investment products such as
common equities, mutual funds, options, commodities, forex
products, and futures. On most of the banking and brokerage Web
sites we sampled, the "trading" tab was featured prominently, often
adjacent to the "banking" tab. Almost without exception, required
disclosures were buried at the bottom of the respective Web pages. 66
This is especially alarming in light of the fact that roughly 42% of
all internet users presently bank online.67
The absence of any meaningful regulatory oversight of this fast-
growing distribution sub-channel undermines the investor
64 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE INTERNET AND THE NATIONAL BANK CHARTER 89
(2001),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/information/ebanking/Internet&NationalBankChrtr.pdf.
65 See Banc of America Online Investing, https://www.baisidirect.comliveflogin.jspv (last
visited Feb. 23, 2010); BB&T Investments, http://www.bbt.com/personal/products/investments
/default.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2009); Citi Investing, https://online.citibank.comUS/JRS/pa
nds/detail.do?ID=InvestingOverview (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); Chase Investments,
https://www.chase.com/ccp/index.jsp?pg name=ccpmapp/individuals/investments/page/plan-b
rkg (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); Key Investment Services, https://www.key.com/html/ira-
investments-retirement.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); PNC Investments,
https://www.pnc.com/webapp/unsec/ProductsAndService.do?siteArea=/pnccorp/
PNC/Home/Personal/Investments+and+Wealth+Management/Investments (last visited Feb.
23, 2010); Morgan Keegan & Co., http://www.regions.com/personal banking/morgan -keegan.r
f (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); WellsFargo, https://www.wellsfargo.comlinvesting/styles/compari
son (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
6 Notably, courts have been reluctant to deem Web site disclosures legally effective if the
user has to scroll to the bottom of the webpage to read them. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape
Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[P]laintiffs could not have learned of the
existence of those terms unless, prior to executing the download, they had scrolled down the
webpage to a screen located below the download button.... [A] reasonably prudent Internet
user in circumstances such as these would not have known or learned of the existence of the
license terms before responding to defendants' invitation to download the free software, and
that defendants therefore did not provide reasonable notice of the license terms.").
67 Kevin Borders et al., Analyzing Websites for User-Visible Security Design Flaws,
SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SEC. July 2008, at 1, 1
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2008/proceedings/pll7Falk.pdf.
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protection potential of the proposed rule change.68 All too often a
broker-dealer affiliated by network arrangement with a financial
institution uses a confusingly similar trade name to that of the
contracting financial institution, with only a perfunctory appendage
such as "Investment Services, LLC." 69  This trend exposes
customers to greater risk online and in the physical bank setting,
because the use of confusingly similar trademarks and names may
lead to the inference that the banker and the broker are the same,
further blurring the line between insured savings products and
risky investment products. Unfortunately, the proposed rule
change does nothing to prevent what appears to have become a
68 See, e.g., John Adams, Small Banks Seen Flocking to Online Account Products, AM.
BANKER, May 29, 2009, at 7 ("Online account-opening applications offer a low-cost way to
increase deposits, according to community and regional bankers."); see also Press Release,
Bank of America Corporation-1st Quarter Results (Apr. 20, 2009) (on file with author)
(providing that Bank of America maintains a total of "approximately 55 million consumer and
small business relationships . . . [and] online banking with nearly 30 million active users").
Online banking has been a boon for financial services marketing:
But just as with the ATM and automated phone systems of a generation earlier, Internet
banking didn't cause a mass migration of transactions from high- to low-cost channels.
Instead, bankers say, it has spurred more transactions than ever.
. .. Wendy Grover, a spokeswoman for Wells Fargo & Co.'s Internet services group,
said the San Francisco banking company has seen the same benefits that Mr. Andrews
described and more. The company is no longer worrying about the kind of benefits it
initially expected from online banking, she said, and instead enjoys customer retention,
cross-selling, and balance growth rewards.
Bill Stoneman, Rationale for Online Banking Starts to Shift, AM. BANKER, Mar. 12, 2001, at
6A (emphasis added); see also More Consumers Prefer, supra note 61; Check 21 Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5001-5018 (2006).
69 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006)); Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1508-09
(2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the likelihood of consumer confusion standard within the Lanham
Act context)); see also Letter from Brewster M. Ellis, Co-Chair, Sec. Indus. Ass'n, to Denise V.
Crawford, Tx. State Sec. Bd. (Apr. 16, 1997), available at
http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment-letters/comment -letterarchives/31224607.pdf
(entitled "Proposed Rules for Sales of Securities at Financial Institutions") ("A non-deposit
investment product must not have a name that is identical to the name of the financial
institution."). For example, all divisions of Citi, including its financial instruments division
and its affiliated broker, use identical marks. Notably, the disclaimer located on Citi's Online
Investing Overview Web site reveals that:
Citi Personal Wealth Management is a business of Citigroup Inc., which offers securities
through Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ("CGMI"), member SIPC. Insurance is offered
through Citigroup Life Agency LLC ("CLA"). In California, CLA does business as
Citigroup Life Insurance Agency, LLC (license number 0G56746). CGMI, CLA and
Citibank, N.A. are affiliated companies under the common control of Citigroup Inc. Citi
and Citi with Arc Design are registered service marks of Citigroup Inc. and its affiliates
and are used and registered throughout the world.
Citibank Online Investing Overview,
https://online.citibank.comiUS/JRS/pands/detail.do?ID=InvestingOverview (last visited Feb.
23, 2010) (emphasis added).
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standard stratagem employed by bankers and brokers to make one
business indistinguishable from the other.
VII. CONCLUSION
The language of the proposed rule change is wholly insufficient to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest. It also lacks
adequate surveillance, inspection and enforcement measures, as
well as appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. The statutory
purpose of "ensur[ing] that communications with customers clearly
identify that the broker-dealer services are provided by the
member"70 is offended by the false sense of security created within
the confines of the financial institution setting. This is true
whether one considers the on-premises "bricks," or the off-premises
"clicks," particularly when coupled with relationship sales tactics
employed by compensated bank employees whose mission it is to
steer customers to affiliated broker-dealers who utilize confusingly
similar trade names and feature the same, or confusingly similar,
logos and trade dress, inadequate signage and vague or non-existent
disclosure.
While the level of documented investment illiteracy demonstrates
a pressing need for thorough investor protection, profound
regulatory gaps continue to exist with regard to, inter alia, the
industry's present use of networking agreements between financial
institutions and affiliated broker-dealers. The SEC should press
FINRA to substantially enhance the provisions of the proposed rule
change so as to protect individual investors and bolster genuine
market integrity.
70 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 3160 (Networking
Arrangements Between Members and Financial Institutions) in the Consolidated FINRA
Rulebook, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,774, 41,774-75 (Aug. 18, 2009).
[Vol. 73.2
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